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Abstract: 
Access to finance has become increasingly difficult, particularly 
for new and service-based industries without tangible assets to 
use as security. Globally, credit guarantee schemes (CGS) are seen 
as important instruments to facilitate achievement of national 
economic goals, as they enable entrepreneurs to gain access to 
finance for venture creation and development. We reviewed CGS 
literature between 1990 and early 2011. We discovered largely 
descriptive studies on the various conditions of the guarantees, 
and considerable research gaps. The desirability of CGS appears 
to be assumed whilst measurement of CGS performance provides 
ambiguous results. We recommend research in a variety of areas 
including: identification of factors that minimise risk, the impacts 
of varying risk sharing ratios, unintended CGS consequences, 
reporting the social dimensions, valuing intangibles, default rates 
in Asian countries, and collateral in a knowledge based economy.  
Keywords: Micro-finance, Loan Securitisation, Small Enterprise 
finance, Loan Guarantee, Credit Guarantee, Collateral, Micro-credit 
JEL Classification: G200, G220, G280 
1. Introduction and background
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play an important role 
in developing and developed economies as they create new business, 
increase employment opportunities, develop innovative product ideas, 
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and raise productivity (Nitani & Riding, 2005). “SMEs represent 99% 
of enterprises around the world and account for more than half of all 
private sector employment in the OECD countries” (CPA Australia, 
CGA, & ACCA, 2009b, p. 8). Their role and need for support in funding 
has been recognized by Governments globally who have introduced a 
variety of initiatives including credit guarantee schemes (CGS). 
We define a CGS as any formal scheme whereby an independent 
third party provides an effective guarantee to lenders. Three parties 
are involved: a borrower who lacks collateral, a lender providing the 
loan or overdraft facility, and a guaranteeing agency (O’Bryan, 2010).  
Boocock and Shariff (2005, p. 428) describe CGS as schemes where
...financial institutions are encouraged to make loans available to 
smaller enterprises, on the understanding that a government or 
quasi-government body will reimburse a percentage of the loan 
should the firm default. 
CGS started in the Philippines in 1952, followed by Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Korea, Taiwan, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and Peru in the 1970’s 
and Chile, Colombia, India, and Thailand in the 1980’s (Levitsky, (1997a). 
Accordingly, Asian countries have had a long experience in operating 
CGS. Access to SMEs finance is difficult and “unsecured lending is the 
area that has been most squeezed” particularly since the 2008 global 
financial crisis (CPA Australia et al., 2009a, p. 13). In response to the 
2008 financial crisis, 19 of the 23 countries within the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) developed policies 
to create or extend CGS to improve SME access to liquidity (Uesugi, 
Sakai, & Yamashiro, 2010). 
The services sector accounts for seventy-five percent (75%) of small 
businesses in the major industrial countries (CPA Australia et al., 2009a), 
and as such, their major assets are intangible. When finance shortages are 
experienced, “intangibles such as goodwill, cash flow and profitability 
no longer cut the grade as quality assets” (CPA Australia, 2010, p. 
20). Historically, perceived risk has been seen as the main deterrent 
to banks’ lending to SMEs (Eyiah, 2001; Levitsky, 1997b; Nigrini & 
Schoombee, 2002). Reported high failure rates (Kang & Heshmati, 2008) 
and perceived intrinsic high risks associated with SME lending, further 
exacerbate financial institutions’ reluctance (Eyiah, 2001). 
Reviewing the CGS literature is important to identify key issues for 
future research and provide wisdom borne of experience for potential 
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adopters. In this paper we provide our review of CGS literature. In 
so doing we discover: Why nations adopt CGS to support business 
activities; the usual conditions of CGS borrowing; and insights into 
CGS performance.  
2. Method
The CGS literature is somewhat fragmented across the fields of 
economics, finance, entrepreneurship, and government policy. Several 
different terms are used to describe CGS including: ‘loan guarantees’, 
‘loan insurance’, ‘credit enhancement’, ‘securitisation’ and ‘collateral 
schemes’. Accordingly, thirteen search terms were used in multiple 
combinations to capture the existing literature. The terms were derived 
at four levels:
i. Terms to exclude not-for-profit organisations - business, firm and 
enterprise.
ii. Terms to exclude large organisations - micro, small and small and 
medium sized. 
iii. Terms to reflect the nature of the lending - loan, overdraft, credit, 
finance.
iv. Terms to reflect the securitisation of the lending - guarantee, 
collateral, security.
From the years 1990 to early 2011 we gathered 101 papers to review. 
We used content analysis to identify common themes from the papers. 
In addition, we classified the 40 papers that reported original empirical 
studies, according to their major focus.
The numbers of published papers rose sharply in the five years 
from 2005 to 2009 (see Table 1). For the year 2010, the number of papers 
published further exceeded the number published in any preceding 
year. This reflects the growing importance of CGS in supporting the 
operations of SMEs.  
Within the first two months of 2011, three papers were published, of 
which two provided experiences of emerging nations. One reviews the 
operation of CGS in the Middle East and North Africa (Saadani, Arvai, 
& Rocha, 2011), and the other discusses the role of Government in India 
(Jahanshahi, Nawaser, Khaksar, & Kamalian, 2011). The third article, 
provides an analysis of Taiwanese guarantee fees based on insurance 
valuation techniques (Kuo, Chen, & Sung, 2011). 
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The 101 papers (Table 1) included reports, conference papers, 
working papers, and theses, in addition to academic journals. Of the 
101 papers, 83 were drawn from 59 peer reviewed journals (Table 2). 
The most frequently sourced journal was Small Business Economics.
Table 1: Published Papers
Year(s) Number of papers Average per year Comment
1990 - 1999 14 1.4 papers None in 1998
2000 - 2004 22 4.4 papers
2005 – 2009 42 8.4 papers 16 in 2009
2010 20 20.0 papers
2011 (early) 3 First 3 months
Total = 101
Table 2: Journal sources
Number of articles Academic Journal
12 Small Business Economics
6 International Small Business Journal
4 World Development
4 Journal of Financial Stability
2 Development Southern Africa
2 The Financier
53 Other journals (one article per journal)
Total = 83 Total number of journals = 59
The 59 journals provide differing perspectives of CGS including 
economics, SME support, finance, social development and alleviation 
of poverty. We noted that 54 countries are reported to have used CGS 
(Table 3). 
Uesugi et al. (2010) claim CGS have been adopted in at least 100 
countries, but unfortunately, they provide no details. The global spread 
of CGS, embraces both developing countries (e.g. Bangladesh and 
Bolivia) and developed countries (e.g. France and Germany).
3. Literature
This section discusses major themes: multiple objectives, risk sharing, 
and the performance of CGS. We conclude by classifying the 40 empirical 
studies.
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3.1  Multiple objectives
In his report to the United Nations Development Programme, Burritt 
(2003, p. 6) discusses finance initiatives (of which CGS is but one), 
and suggests some may have been “shallow programmes designed to 
win political favour.” He believes they are now focussed on assisting 
commercially viable enterprises. CGS objectives differ from country to 
country (Nitani & Riding, 2005). We classify the objectives at macro or 
micro levels:
 At a macro level, CGSs are designed to assist in achieving national 
policy goals including:
• Welfare and stability of society (Kang & Heshmati, 2008).
• Job creation and retention (Riding & Haines, 2001).
• Accelerating economic growth and decreasing unemployment 
(Kang & Heshmati, 2008).
• Reducing poverty generally (Roodman & Qureshi, 2006) or 
selectively, through the expansion of tiny informal sector 
income-generating projects (Bateman & Chang, 2009).
Table 3: Countries reported to have used Credit Guarantee Schemes
Argentina
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Bolivia
Burkina Faso
Canada
China
Columbia
Conakri Guinea
Denmark
Ecuador 
Egypt
France
Germany
Greece
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Italy
Ivory Coast
Japan
Khula
Korea
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Scotland
Senegal
Slovakia
Solvinia
Spain
Sri Lanka
Switzerland
Taiwan
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States of America
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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• Correcting imperfections in the market for small business 
loans (De la Torre, Martínez, & Schmukler, 2010).
All these initiatives are intended to assist targeted economic 
activities. Some are specifically directed towards particular communities 
or types of investment. For example, agriculture, artisans (De Gobbi, 
2003), environmentally friendly investments (Leistner, 1999), and 
manufacturing (Boocock & Shariff, 2005). 
Typically, a government passes its CGS initiative to a Ministry in 
charge of economic and social development; and sets aside funds to 
support guarantees for loans made to ‘disadvantaged’ entrepreneurs 
(Honohan, 2010).  The Ministry may administer the funds itself or 
appoint another agency to do so. For example, in Malaysia, the Credit 
Guarantee Corporation  guarantees the return of  lending by other 
financial institutions to SMEs (Conroy, 2003).
At a micro level CGS are intended:
a) To assist borrowers by:
• Increasing loan availability to SMEs (Nitani & Riding, 2005).
• Ensuring new business formation, development and 
expansion (Levitsky, 1997b; Nitani & Riding, 2005; Roodman 
& Qureshi, 2006).
• Improving access to finance for SMEs (Beck, Klapper, & 
Mendoza, 2010).
• Reducing costs of borrowing (Beck et al., 2010).
b) To provide incentives for lenders by:
• Encouraging financial institutions to lend to SMEs, which are 
unable to provide adequate collateral or do not have financial 
records to prove their creditworthiness (Nigrini & Schoombee, 
2002).
• Diversifying risk across lenders (Beck et al., 2010). 
• Overcoming information asymmetries by involving 
guarantors in the application and monitoring processes (Beck 
et al., 2010).
• Allowing lenders to shift loan recovery risks to guarantors 
(Levitsky, 1997b).
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A common theme is lender reluctance, particularly in developing 
countries:
Hardly a conference or meeting on SMEs takes place, anywhere 
in the developing world, where there is not a litany of complaints 
from representatives of small businesses and from public officials 
condemning the reluctance of most commercial banks to lend to 
SMEs (Levitsky, 1997b). 
Yet, the majority of national CGS operate through commercial banks 
(Beck et al., 2010). CGSs must overcome banker reluctance to provide 
support to the SMEs. The literature identifies a number of perceived 
deterrents that may explain banker reluctance to lend to SMEs, including 
risk, collateral and cost:
a) Risk
• Lack of reliable risk measures (Boocock & Shariff, 2005; Kang 
& Heshmati, 2008).
• Little or no credit history (de la Torre et al., 2010)
• Few or no reliable records (Boocock & Shariff, 2005).
b) Collateral
• Lack of or inadequate collateral (Eyiah, 2001).
• Reduced borrower repayment commitment, as a consequence 
of the limited liability CGS provide (Cowling & Mitchell, 
2003).
c) Cost
• High costs, and conversely, low returns (Boocock & Shariff, 
2005; Nigrini & Schoombee, 2002).
• High transaction costs for relatively small loan amounts that 
are below banks’ normal lending thresholds (Beck et al., 2010; 
Boocock & Shariff, 2005).
CGSs provide collateral as compensation for potentially uncertain 
loan repayments (Boocock & Shariff, 2005), and CGS also provide safety 
nets for lenders whilst they “learn more about SMEs, their problems and 
their operations” (Levitsky, 1997a, p. 5). Overall, CGSs differ according 
to their objectives and community needs as perceived by particular 
governments. An implicit underlying assumption appears to be that 
CGSs finance to SMEs assists capacity building, whilst maintaining or 
stimulating business environments. In attempting to do so, governments 
tend to take on the major  burden of risk.
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3.2  Risk sharing ratios, premiums and fees
Risk sharing ratios differ from country to country. Their rationale is 
uncertain and appears to depend on the relative negotiating skills of 
bankers and of credit guaranteeing agencies.  Often risk is shared on 
the basis of 80% guarantee from the funding agency and 20% on the 
part of the lending bank (Nigrini & Schoombee, 2002).  
Table 4: Risk Sharing: guaranteed portion under a scheme
Country
Agency
Guaranteed portion
Lender
Risk portion
Japan 100% 0%
United States 90% 10%
South Africa 80% 20%
Malaysia 70-90% 10-30%
Indonesia 70% 30%
Egypt 50% 50%
The 100% portion borne by the Japanese CGS (Uesugi et al., 2010) 
removes all risk to lenders. We suggest such an approach may reduce 
lender incentive to adequately screen potential borrowers. The United 
States’ 504 scheme provides a 90% guarantee for the purchase of fixed 
assets (Davis & Moon, 1991). Risk-sharing conditions are negotiated 
between funders and lenders when the CGSs are set up, or arbitrarily 
determined by the initiating government. For example, in Malaysia the 
guaranteed portion is varied in accordance with government priorities 
(Boocock & Shariff, 2005). 
Boocock and Shariff (2005) believe that a 90% guarantee is too high 
and propose a ratio of 80:20.  Nigrini and Schoombee (2002, p. 743) prefer 
a 70:30 ratio but provide no rationale apart from stating “a minimum 
of 30 per cent of the risk [to the lender] appears to be a reasonable 
benchmark.” This ratio is used in Indonesia (Kuncoro, 2008) where the 
CGS is operated through government banks, and all losses are borne 
by the State. Lower levels of guarantee (50-70%) are thought to ensure 
that lenders take ‘reasonable measures’ to manage and recover loans as 
needed (Freedman, 2004). Levitsky (1997a) considers a 50:50 risk sharing 
would be unattractive to lenders, but notes in Egypt it was successful 
when other financial incentives were also offered. 
Generally however, the rationale underlying any specific risk 
sharing ratio is not discussed.  Rather there seems to be some practice 
Credit Guarantee Schemes Supporting Small Enterprise Development: A Review
Asian Journal of Business and Accounting 5(2), 2012 29
of benchmarking against other countries, regardless of appropriateness. 
For example, in a report for the World Bank on CGS in ten countries 
in the Middle East and North African region, Saadani et al. (2011) note 
that risk sharing ratios are in line with international practice. Yet, they 
suggest risk sharing ratios should be linked to perceived business risk 
and not operate as flat rates for all businesses. Overall, there appears to 
be agreement that part of the responsibility of managing loans should 
be borne by banks. We suggest, further research should be undertaken 
to ascertain how the various parties are affected by risk sharing ratios 
and what factors are taken into account during negotiations (if any 
negotiations actually take place).
Extra safeguards may be implemented to cover risks of lending 
to people with little collateral. In this situation some lenders require 
borrowers to take out insurance policies against loan default (Roodman 
& Qureshi, 2006). Others require personal items, such as jewellery and 
household appliances, as collateral (Burritt, 2003). Further, a premium 
may be applied to interest rates. For example in Malaysia that premium 
is between 3-5% (Boocock & Shariff, 2005) and in Canada it is 3% 
(CPA Australia et al., 2009a). Often, the borrower is required to pay an 
application fee. For example in Japan 1% of the loan amount is charged 
(Uesugi et al., 2010) and in Australia a 2% ‘registration’ fee is charged 
(CPA Australia et al., 2009a). We believe these extra SME charges are 
unfair, particularly when CGS collateral is provided.
In Malaysia, Korea, and Taiwan, ‘guarantee fees’ vary according 
to ‘borrower credit’ rating, whilst in Hungary, fees are based on a 
combination of  ‘borrower credit’ rating and loan risk rating (Saadani et 
al., 2011). A South African CGS requires owners to make ‘contributions’ 
but with a special twist!  Borrowers have to pay 1% of the loan amount as 
an application fee and may have to put in 10% of funding – depending 
on race. Under this scheme, banks apply to the guaranteeing agency on 
behalf of borrowers (Nigrini & Schoombee, 2002). Whilst this enhances 
lenders control of their risks, it may also provide opportunities to use 
guarantees to cover risky loans. Monitoring or regulations need to be 
in place to ensure lenders do not profit at the expense of borrowers.
3.3  Performance 
Government provided CGSs have been widely accepted as desirable, 
yet, they have not been “fully evaluated, thus it is difficult to identify 
best practice” (CPA Australia, 2010, p. 13). Meyer and Nagarajan (1996) 
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suggest performance measurement is thwarted by limited clarity 
regarding: desired outcomes, research methods, and measurement 
techniques. For example, outcomes are often expressed in general terms, 
such as “a positive impact on social welfare” (de la Torre et al., 2010, p. 
347). Uesugi et al. (2010) suggest there has been little analysis undertaken 
at firm level. They point out that when new business is generated, 
no prior-guarantee-period data is available, making it impossible to 
ascertain tangible CGS-related firm improvements.  
Usually CGS performance is evaluated through two measures: 
default rates and job creation rates. Riding and Haines (2001) estimate 
that from 1992-1999 the Canadian Small Business Loan scheme average 
default cost was $2,000 per job created. They conclude that CGS are an 
“extraordinarily effective means of stimulating job creation and assisting 
small firms to survive and grow” (Riding & Haines, 2001, p 611). In 
the US, Craig, Jackson, andThomson (2008) indicate that increased 
employment occurs principally in low income areas. By contrast, a 
Korean study concludes that employment did not increase (Kang & 
Heshmati, 2008).  
CGS performance may be inhibited by borrower reluctance. Some 
SME operators seem to be put off by the CGS application process and 
unaware of its high applicant success rate (ACCA & CBI, 2011).
The process of seeking financing can demand many hours of 
management time, preparation of extensive documents, market or 
other research to justify risks and satisfy financial institutions and 
investors (CPA Australia et al., 2009a, p. 6).  
Some SME operators believe that CGS are costly (Garcia-Tabuenca & 
Crespo-Espert, 2010).  Some consider debt too risky (Haque & Harbin, 
2009). Others lack awareness and interest as in the United Kingdom 
only 48% of SMEs were aware of their government’s CGS initiatives 
and only 21% were aware of the European Union CGS (ACCA & CBI, 
2011). Lack of knowledge and interest in available CGS on the part of 
the SMEs is disconcerting (Levitsky, 1997a) and could contribute to 
disappointing  outcomes for schemes.
An evaluation of developing country schemes conducted by Meyer 
and Nagarajan (1996) led them to suspect that CGS have a history of 
collapse. It seems CGS can generate positive short-run outcomes for 
SMEs, but their long-term developmental outcomes are debatable 
(Bateman & Chang, 2009). For example, the 1998-2001 Japanese CGS 
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resulted in no overall increase in SMEs loans as banks ‘misused’ it to 
substitute their non-guaranteed loans for guaranteed loans (Uesugi et 
al., 2010). Apparently appropriate measures were not in place. CGSs 
require monitoring to ensure they are administered for their intended 
purpose.  
In Canada, Germany, Holland, Japan and USA default rates range 
from a low 2.2% to 6% (Nitani & Riding, 2005). By contrast the UK 
CGS experienced a default rate of 15% (Nitani & Riding, (2005). We 
recommend further research to ascertain the underlying factors that 
contribute to varying default rates in various countries and default 
rates in Asian countries.
Research suggests that CGS have increased the total availability of 
finance to SMEs (Boocock & Shariff, 2005; Honohan, 2010; Oh et al., 2009; 
Riding, Madill & Haines 2007; Uesugi et al., 2010). Research is needed 
to investigate claims of unintended CGS consequences:
• That CGSs mitigate the exit of inefficient firms (Camino & Cardone, 
1999).
• That higher interest rates result in firms undertaking riskier projects 
(de la Torre et al., 2010; Uesugi et al., 2010).
• That firms use loans to cover operating losses (Uesugi et al., 2010).
And so, support for CGS continues. Some researchers argue that 
CGSs are preferable to providing lenders with cheap, subsidized funds 
(Levitsky, 1997b; Vogel & Adams, 1997). Future research could explore 
CGSs costs and benefits in terms of economic and social development. 
3.4  Empirical Studies
This section reports our classification of the CGS paper focus from the 
40 original empirical studies, which consist of  28 academic articles, 
seven government or quasi-governing agency reports, and five others 
(including working papers and conference papers). Table 5 classifies 
these works under five topic areas. 
The focus of research has been upon measuring CGS outcomes. 
Little attention has been cast toward lender costs and the perspectives 
of borrowers. Research into the development and design of CGS is 
generally prepared for organisations, such as the World Bank. We find 
discussion in  academic literature is relatively undeveloped and tends 
to focus on measuring outcomes of CGS. Single-country analysis has 
been conducted in six countries of Southern and South-East Asia - India, 
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Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Korea. Four academic articles 
have focused on outcomes in Korean and Malaysia.
In summary, the literature focuses on banker reluctance to lend 
to SMEs, purported economic benefits of supporting SME finance, 
and ‘benefit measurement’ difficulties. Much of the literature provides 
descriptions and objectives of the terms and conditions of various CGSs. 
Practical advice is provided in government or World Bank reports 
which focus on CGS set up and implementation considerations. Most 
of the literature accepts without question that CGSs are both desirable 
and necessary. 
4. Discussion and Recommendations
Generally CGSs are implemented by local governments to enhance social 
and economic development. CGS assistance provides opportunities for 
human development – such as job creation and enhanced self-respect. 
Whilst the schemes enable certain disadvantaged entrepreneurs to 
obtain formal business loans, this brings challenges. Haque and Harbin 
(2009), question whether those who require CGS loans have sufficient 
social relations, self-confidence, and assets to provide loan collateral. 
Accordingly, CGS staff at the Grameen Bank “work as constant 
cheerleaders” for borrowers (Haque & Harbin, 2009, p. 9).  By contrast, 
those operating in Zambia tend to focus on ensuring that  repayments 
are met as agreed. (Siwale & Ritchie, 2010).  
CPA Australia (2010, p. 13) notes that CGS predominately 
“are designed to solve immediate liquidity issues only, and have a 
limited life.” Due to the short term, target-driven nature of CGS, it is 
difficult to map the feature of schemes over time and across countries. 
Additionally, there is limited discussion in the literature regarding the 
assumptions underlying the provision of support through CGS. Two 
writers identified assumptions that underlie CGS. Arun (2005) notes 
that micro-financing institutions assume the poor need access to credit, 
not cheap credit. Whilst Acs (2010) argues that enhanced credit equity 
is needed. A welcome and refreshing addition to the literature would 
be a robust discussion regarding the impact of CGS access to finance, 
including an examination of assumptions underlying such initiatives.
In many countries CGS are provided alongside other SME 
incentives including subsidies, grants, taxation deferrals and 
concessions.  Boocock and Shariff (2005) suggest high risk activities 
should be supported and encouraged by incentives such as grants or 
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equity contributions, rather than by CGS. They believe such incentives 
would be less costly to set-up, operate and manage. Taxation deferrals 
and concessions could operate through existing taxation authorities and 
agencies. Incentive regulations could be established by governments 
through normal legislative processes, without alterations to extensive 
agreements necessary to operating CGS.
The move from industrial and technological based economies, 
to knowledge economies, shifts the emphasis from tangible products 
to intangible products. This shift brings a corresponding increase in 
reliance on knowledge as the principal asset for many SMEs. Presently, 
intangible assets and products are not considered adequate collateral. 
It seems a lender mindset change is required (Levitsky, 1997b). We 
encourage research into a broader range of collateral alternatives and 
risk minimalisation strategies. The early financial supporters of firms 
such as Microsoft and Google had to wrestle with such issues, but, 
what a pay-off!  
Globally, CGSs are being used to support SMEs in different 
situations. For example, the 2007-13 European Union Competitiveness 
and Innovation Framework Programme, offers CGS to SMEs to 
encourage new businesses and to stimulate economic growth (European 
Community, 2011), and following the 2011 earthquake, the Japanese 
government, offered guarantees for small firms to borrow from 
commercial banks (Reuters, 2011). We contend that the importance of 
CGS will grow.
CGSs are deemed necessary to assist SMEs overcome limited 
finance availability, perceived risk, limited tangible collateral, changing 
global business environments, and tightening credit conditions. 
Freedman (2004, p 23) argues:
Loan guarantees are an additional tool for building robust credit 
markets, and they will prove more effective when implemented 
together with technical assistance or policy reform that alleviates 
barriers to credit.
Research suggests suitable legal and regulatory frameworks are required 
to create business environments that are conducive to entrepreneurial 
efforts (Amorós, 2009; De Gobbi, 2003; Rocks, 2010). For example, in 
the Philippines, regulations had to be modified to allow banks to secure 
loans on clients’ cash flow, rather than on traditional collateral (Conroy, 
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2003). CGSs need monitoring to check that national regulations are 
supportive, and to avoid unintended consequences.
Further, we recommend monitoring of CGS so that lenders may not 
unfairly profit through additional fees, high interest and loan premiums. 
These seem unnecessary for two reasons. CGS loans are guaranteed 
by governments and SMEs tend to be good payers. Strategies need to 
be developed to prevent the kinds of actions that occurred in Japan 
where banks used CGS to cover their existing non-guaranteed loans. 
Policies need to be in place to ensure that appropriate CGS performance 
measures, and adequate administrative monitoring, are in place to 
ensure CGS are being used for their intended purposes. Further, efforts 
are needed by policy makers to correct erroneous perceptions by SMEs 
that loan applications will most likely be rejected, and by lenders that 
without collateral SMEs are likely to default or default at a higher rate 
than ‘normal’ credit applicants. 
Overall CGSs provide lenders with opportunities to enhance 
their client base, and potentially their reputations. Research suggests 
that on CGS completion, many clients remain with their CGS bank as 
commercial customers (Camino & Cardone, 1999). However, some 
governments did not provide adequate support when CGS loans 
defaulted (Levitsky, 1997a), thus placing pressure on financiers. This 
may be due to CGS design faults, or inadequate debt-collection and 
judicial processes – offering more room for future research.  
A number of accounting issues are not discussed in the literature, 
such as: how CGS agencies can measure the value of their guarantee, 
and how stakeholders could report the social dimensions of CGSs? 
Further, at an operational level, there appears to be room for discussion 
regarding elements common to various schemes around the globe, such 
as: the level of contribution and fees to be borne by applicants and the 
proportions of guarantees to be borne by borrowers, guarantor agencies 
and lenders.
Additionally, further research is recommended to examine and 
better understand CGS effectiveness. For example, research to:
i. Ascertain how various parties are affected by risk sharing ratios 
and what factors are taken into account during negotiations (if any 
negotiations actually take place).
ii. Gather data on borrowers’ and lenders’ perspectives on CGS 
successes (and failures)
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iii. Develop methods to evaluate intangible products and services for 
collateral. 
iv. Ascertain setup costs, and operating agency costs, in CGS provision.
v. Measure the effects of CGS against their stated objectives.
vi. Examine and report unintended consequences as a result of CGS 
activities.
vii. Test the claims that 
a. CGS mitigate the exit of inefficient firms, and 
b. Higher interest rates in CGS result in borrowers undertaking 
riskier projects in comparison with non-CGS projects.
In our view, for the most part, the literature does not take a 
critical perspective. In the main, it provides descriptive case studies. 
Therefore, more empirical and independent critical research is required. 
Particularly, research into factors that minimise risk and maximise 
positive CGS impact (Beck et al., 2010). It would also be interesting to 
research the effects of long-term reliance on CGS. In so doing, researchers 
could develop reliable risk measures that protect all parties. Our review 
of 101 papers has provided a rich tapestry of various CGS operating 
around the globe. At the same time we note that these works generally 
are independently compiled with little debate between writers on issues 
we believe are important to the implementation and performance of 
CGS. Accordingly, our discussion has emphasised a need for further 
research for more informed strategies to be implemented by policy 
makers.  
5. Conclusion
Our contribution is a review of the recent CGS literature to promote 
enhanced decision-making and public policy formation in Asia and 
the rest of the world. We find multiple objectives operate, at both the 
macro and micro levels. CGSs are used globally, and increasingly they 
are being used to provide support to developing small enterprises. 
Overall, CGS providers assume that increasing the access to finance is 
desirable for ‘disadvantaged’ SMEs. 
A number of writers provide insight into the design and nature 
of schemes. However, CGS research and outcome measurements are 
inconclusive. In some papers ambiguous results are provided without 
supporting financial data. We do not find literature that compares CGS 
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with other finance access schemes. Scheme input costs are only partially 
reported, and setup and operating costs are not discussed.  
A new mindset regarding collateral is necessary for lenders offering 
finance to entrepreneurs’ whose principal assets are intellectual capital. 
We see the move to knowledge based economies, with the production 
of many intangible products and services, will force a re-examination 
of traditional ways of assessing business risk. We recommend new 
ways of assessing risk via credit worthiness and the ability of borrowers 
to repay loans. More, and newer forms of, CGS may be necessary to 
enable entrepreneurs to access finance; along with new ways to measure 
and monitor CGSs costs, benefits and success, especially in terms of 
achieving national targets.
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